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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF IggUES 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
the jury verdict that respondent was not the proximate cause 
of appellant's injuries. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying appell-
ant 's Motion for New Trial. 
gTANDAfiP QF REVIEW 
1. Appellant challenges the jury's factual deter-
minations in this appeal. "Where evidence is in conflict in 
a jury trial, [this court] will review the facts and the 
reasonable inferences that arise from those facts in a light 
most supportive of the jury's verdict." Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985). 
2. Appellant also challenges the denial of appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial. The trial court's denial of a motion 
for new trial will on be reversed "if, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, [this 
court] conclude[s] that the evidence is insufficient to 
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support the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 799, 800 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STAUTES 
Respondent contends that Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is determinative to this appeal. That statute is 
•set forth verbatim as follows: 
New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any 
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party 
was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as 
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved 
by the affidavit of any one of the jurors, 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
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(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceeding 
This case arose out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on or about October 6, 1992, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The appellant filed a complaint on August 2, 1993. A 
four-day trial commenced on November 29, 1994. At the 
trial's conclusion, the jury returned a verdict that the 
respondent was not the proximate cause of any damages 
complained of by appellant. Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial was denied, and appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 
April 26, 1995. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on 
October 6, 1992 (R. at p. 1). 
3 
2. A number of medical witnesses testified at the 
instant trial and told the jury that, in their opinion, 
appellant was a malingerer, e.g., embellishing symptoms, 
deliberately trying to mislead the examiner during the course 
of the examination. The testimony in this regard is 
summarized below: 
A. Dr. Anaelo Santiago 
Dr. Santiago is a neurologist who examined appellant at 
the request of the Social Security Administration for the 
purpose of determining disability (R. at pp. 1523-24). 
During the course of his interview and examination of 
appellant, Dr. Santiago noted a number of inconsistencies. 
Appellant reported that he had not been able to eat well 
since the accident but had gained a significant amount of 
weight (R. at pp. 1529-30). The doctor's examination showed 
give way weakness during several portions of the range of 
motion and strength testing, suggestive of symptom 
embellishment (R. at p. 1544) . During straight leg raising 
tests, appellant reported pain even at the slightest 
elevation of either leg, yet deep tendon reflexes of the 
lower extremities were normal. Dr. Santiago noted this as an 
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inconsistency and that it suggested symptom embellishment (R. 
at pp. 1547-48). 
In conclusion, Dr. Santiago testified that his overall 
examination and interview with appellant was flavored by an 
"incredible amount of embellishment." (R. at p. 1549). 
B. Dr. James Guinn 
Dr. James Guinn saw and examined appellant for a defense 
independent medical examination regarding appellant's claims 
of temporal mandibular joinc dysfunction. As part of the 
process, Dr. Guinn had appellant fill out a seven-page 
questionnaire listing, among other things, symptoms 
experienced. Dr. Guinn found it highly unusual that 
appellant indicated on the questionnaire that he was 
suffering from every symptom discussed in the questionnaire 
(R. at p. 935). 
After reviewing more than 400 pages of medical records 
pertaining to appellant, interviewing appellant and examining 
appellant, Dr. Guinn testified to the jury that it was his 
opinion that appellant was an extreme symptom magnifier and 
was deliberately trying to mislead him during the course of 
his examination (R. at pp. 943-44). 
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C. Dr. Linda Gummow 
Dr. Gummow saw and examined appellant at the referral of 
appellant's treating psychologist, Dr. Ralph Gant. He was 
referred to Dr. Gummow for neuro-psychological testing and 
evaluation (R. at p. 1073). During her first visit with 
appellant, Dr. Gummow took a detailed history from appellant 
of various aspects of his life. Appellant reported to Dr. 
Gummow that he had been involved in the Viet Nam war, had 
been wounded in combat, had been exposed to Agent Orange and 
had experienced respiratory problems since the war (R. at pp. 
1075-76). 
After Dr. Gummow had prepared and issued her report 
regarding appellant, appellant met with Dr. Gummow once again 
and indicated to her that he had not given her accurate 
information regarding the above-described. In the subsequent 
meeting, appellant told Dr. Gummow that most of the problems 
he reported arose after the 1992 automobile accident and not 
the Viet Nam war (in which he was never involved). Further, 
appellant asked Dr. Gummow to change her report. Dr. Gummow 
refused (R. at pp. 1082-1087). 
After this last visit with appellant, Dr. Gummow re-
evaluated the information generated from examining and 
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interviewing appellant and testified to the jury, giving her 
opinion that appellant was malingering (R. at pp. 943-44) . 
D. DrT Letter Nielson 
Dr. Nielson is a clinical psychologist who saw and 
examined appellant at the request of the Social Security 
Administration for a disability determination. Dr. Nielson 
testified that he reviewed only four pages of medical 
information prior to seeing, testing and evaluating 
appellant. Subsequent to issuing his report, he reviewed the 
entire battery of information pertinent to appellant's case. 
After being fully informed of all of the information, it was 
Dr. Nielson's opinion that appellant was a malingerer (R. at 
pp. 568-87) . 
3. Private investigator Brian Ritucci testified that 
he videotaped appellant on July 1, July 2 and July 4, 1994. 
He described to the jury following the appellant's vehicle, 
operated by appellant, to a Little League soccer game where 
he observed appellant watching the game, carrying different 
items to and from his vehicle, and engaging in normal day-to-
day activities (R. at pp. 902-19). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY VERDICT. 
Appellant's primary argument on appeal is that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. It is 
established in Utah law that a jury verdict will not be 
disturbed if there was sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991). In the present case, respondent contends that there 
was not only sufficient evidence to support a verdict, but 
there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury verdict. 
Appellant argues that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that his back, knee, TMJ and psychological injuries were 
caused by the accident. On the other hand, respondent 
asserts that there was sufficient evidence to show exactly 
the opposite—that appellant's injuries were not caused by 
the accident. In this connection, the appellant has the 
burden of establishing a prima facie case that respondent's 
negligence was the proximate cause of appellant's harm. 
Wessell v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
19 85). The jury was not convinced that appellant had carried 
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his burden. There is no basis to question that factual 
determination. 
Appellant is requesting that the court take a small 
portion of the evidence and consider it in the light most 
favorable to him, draw all inferences in his favor, and 
ignore all of the rebutting, explaining and countering 
evidence. In effect, appellant is seeking to have the court 
disregard much of the evidence presented at trial. 
Appellant's argument must be rejected. As he recognizes in 
his brief, appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799. 
Clearly, appellant has failed to make the necessary 
showing. He has selectively listed only a small portion of 
the evidence supporting the verdict. Appellant has merely 
attempted to refute the credibility of the evidence which 
supported the verdict and rely on other, contradictory 
evidence that supports his position. Appellant's argument 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial has no legal basis given his complete failure to 
marshal the evidence. 
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Overwhelming evidence was presented at trial which 
supports the jury's verdict. The evidence in support of the 
respondent's position is set forth as follows: 
The record is replete with evidence showing that 
appellant was being far less than candid with his medical 
providers. In treating this issue, it is important to note 
the testimony of Dr. Amy Gereso, the emergency room physician 
who initially examined appellant after the subject accident. 
After performing a complete examination upon appellant and 
after reviewing x-rays and CT scans, it was Dr. Gereso' s 
opinion that appellant had suffered a strain/sprain injury to 
the neck and back and the symptoms would clear up in a 
relatively short period of time: 
Q. What was your diagnosis after seeing Mr. 
LeBlanc and examining him? 
A. My diagnosis was cervical neck strain, muscle 
strain and also lumbar muscle strain. 
Q. Now, doctor, you indicated that you have had a 
chance to treat a fairly good number of people with 
this type of injury the past. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your experience, what types of symptoms do 
people with this strain condition have? 
A. They have tenderness of the muscles and 
stiffness and pain. But they usually don't have 
any neurological problems. 
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Q. How long do these symptoms usually last, in 
your experience? 
A. I would say that a large number steadily 
improve and get better gradually over weeks to 
a month or two. 
Q. Was there anything about Mr. LeBlanc°s history 
or examination that would lead you to conclude 
that he was any different from the majority of 
patients you have seen and examined? 
A. No. 
(R. at pp. 892-93.) 
Considering the opinion of Dr. Gereso in light of the 
medical witnesses called by respondent, the solid evidentiary 
basis for the jury verdict in the instant case becomes 
apparent. 
The neurologist, Dr. Angelo Santiago, who was a 
completely neutral witness in the instant case, rendered some 
informative opinions and impressions regarding appellant: 
Q. Moving on to your assessment and impressions 
portion of your report, you state that your 
examination of Mr. LeBlanc is, quote, flavored 
by an incredible amount of embellishment. Do 
you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you mean by that? 
A. Embellishment is words we use to mean that the 
patient probably is, urn, alleging symptoms or 
displaying symptoms more than what we think he 
is experiencing. 
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Q. You indicate one more time the alleged memory 
loss was striking. You indicate that you find 
it absurd that he cannot even add one plus 
one. Do you see that? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What do you mean by saying you find it absurd 
that he cannot even add one plus one? 
A. I mentioned awhile ago. It's incongruous that 
he was able to recite what happened exactly 
on-- during the accident, even mentioned the 
precise date or what I think was the right 
date, the figure of the repair costs, and 
can't even add one plus one is virtually--
which is virtually a test for memory, simple 
memory, is unrealistic for me. 
at pp. 1551-52.) 
Similarly, Dr. Guinn, the TMJ defense expert, testified 
the jury as follows: 
Q. Doctor, what did all this lead you to 
conclude? 
A. It led me to conclude that this individual was 
an extreme symptom magnifier. That he was 
being dishonest with me, that every step of 
the way he was not being candid about what his 
problems really were. 
Q. What is your definition, doctor, of a 
malingerer? 
A. My definition would be an individual who is 
trying to embellish what their problems 
might be, trying to convince others that they 
have problems that aren't really there, and 
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actually impeding or hindering any kind of efforts 
to assist them in resolving their problems. That's 
very much my opinion in this case. 
(R. at pp. 943-44. ) 
Consistent with the above is the testimony of Dr. Linda 
Gummow, a neuropsychologist who saw appellant at the referral 
of appellant's own treating psychologist, Dr. Ralph Gant. 
Dr. Gummow's opinion of appellant's condition after meeting 
face-to-face with appellant for the last time is particularly 
critical: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
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What happened on that second occasion-- or I'm 
sorry, that September 3 0 meeting? 
Mr. LeBlanc indicated to me that his attorney, 
Mr. Summerhays, wanted him to straighten out 
his history with me. And he told me that he 
had not been stationed in Viet Nam but had 
actually been stationed on a ship in the navy, 
and that he had not been in combat conditions 
and that he had not been exposed to Agent 
Orange. And that the knife wound did not come 
from combat but came from a domestic alter-
cation. 
Did he give you any information about these 
breathing problems that he had explained to 
you before? 
Yes. He indicated that he thought that the 
breathing problems that he had were more like 
panic attacks, and that he hadn't been the 
same since the accident. 
Q. Dr. Gummow, did this last meeting with Mr. 
LeBlanc impact your opinions about Mr. LeBlanc 
in any way? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How did it impact them? 
A. Well, I became more concerned about the 
possibility of malingering. I had not thought 
that Mr. LeBlanc was malingering in spite of 
some abnormal findings when I first did my 
report. But the fact that he had told me some 
falsehoods made me concerned. So I went back 
and looked at some of my data again more 
carefully. 
Q. Thank you. I want to jump back quickly to 
your September 1993 meeting with Mr. LeBlanc. 
After he retracted those statements, what did 
he ask you to do with your report? 
A. He asked me if I would call it back. 
Q. To change it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him I could not do that. 
(R. at pp. 1082-84.) After explaining to the jury that she 
had reviewed additional information pertaining to appellant, 
received from the office of counsel for respondent, Dr. 
Gummow testified as follows: 
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Q. Doctor, since reviewing all of the information 
that you received from my office, has that 
impacted your opinions from a psychological 
standpoint regarding Mr* LeBlanc? 
A. Yes, 
Q. What i s your opinion now regard ing Mr. 
LeBlanc? 
A. I b e l i e v e t h a t the evidence i s q u i t e 
conv inc ing t h a t Mr. LeBlanc has been 
malingering. 
Qc Doctor, given a l l of t h i s , can you say with 
any degree of reasonable c e r t a i n t y tha t Mr. 
LeBlanc sus ta ined any head in jury in t h i s 
accident? 
A„ No, I cannot. 
(R. a t p . 1087.) 
Psychologist Lester Nielson, who saw appellant at the 
request of the Social Security Administration, admittedly 
reviewed only four pages of medical records regarding Mr. 
LeBlanc before preparing his report. The opinion he 
expressed to the jury during the instant trial, after 
reviewing all of the pertinent medical information relative 
to Mr. LeBlanc, was very similar to the opinions described 
above (R. at pp. 1028-29). 
Another critical component to the evidence supporting 
the jury verdict in the instant case is the testimony of the 
private investigator, Brian Ritucci. He followed appellant, 
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observed and videotaped appellant on July 1, July 2 and July 
4, 1994 (R. at p. 904). Mr. Ritucci testified that he 
followed appellant to a soccer game where he observed and 
videotaped appellant watching a soccer game. During the 
soccer game, Mr. Ritucci testified that he saw and videotaped 
appellant picking up and carrying an ice chest, standing up 
and sitting down numerous times, squatting on the ground, 
walking around and engaging in conversation with other 
people. Mr. Ritucci also testified that he never saw 
appellant limp, grab his neck or grab his back (R. at pp. 
902-914). 
Summarizing the evidence presented to the jury in the 
instant case, appellant claimed that he received soft tissue 
injuries to his neck and back, temporal mandibular joint 
injury and brain injury. Respondent defended the case on the 
basis that appellant was not injured and that he was 
deliberately trying to mislead medical providers who examined 
him. Both sides put on their cases and called witnesses to 
support their respective contentions. The jury heard 
evidence on both sides of the issues of soft tissue, back and 
neck injury, temporal mandibular joint injury and traumatic 
brain injury. The jury simply found respondent's evidence 
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and witnesses to be more credible. This is certainly the 
jury's prerogative and the evidence supports the jury's 
decision. See Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 
529-530 (Utah App. 1990), where polarized expert testimony 
was rendered during a jury trial regarding plaintiff's 
claimed closed-head injury. The jury's award showed that the 
jury believed the defense witness and did not believe the 
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the jury court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial, reasoning that to do so would be invading the 
province of the jury. 
In the instant case, there is clearly sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. Appellant's 
challenge to the verdict on the ground of insufficient 
evidence should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The trial court "is not free to grant a new trial merely 
because it disagrees with the judgment of the jury. A new 
trial may properly be granted only when the jury's verdict is 
'manifestly against the weight of the evidence.'" Goddard v. 
Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). Further, if evidence 
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was submitted to the jury that could have supported the 
jury's verdict, the verdict should not be disturbed. Price-
Orem Investment Co. v. Rawlins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 
P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986) . 
In Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 497 P.2d 236 
(Utah 1972), reviewing a trial court's decision denying 
plaintiff a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In the instant action, the jury was required 
to weigh the conflicting evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the 
questions of fact thus presented as well as the 
ultimate fact of negligence. In view of the sub-
stantially conflicting evidence and the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, fair-minded men might 
reasonably entertain different conclusions; there-
fore, this court cannot hold that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. 
Pollesche at 236. 
In this matter, as set forth in detail in Point I of 
this brief, there was clearly evidence that supported the 
verdict. The fact that appellant disputed the evidence is 
irrelevant to this appeal. Appellant has not carried his 
burden to marshal the evidence and should not be granted a 
new trial because of the overwhelming evidence which 
supported the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's challenge to the jury's factual determina-
tions have no basis in law. Ample evidence supported the 
verdict, and appellant has failed to marshal all evidence 
that supported the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
supporting evidence was insufficient. 
This court should affirm the verdict and the trial 
court's denial of appellant's Motion for a New Trial. 
Respondent should also be awarded his costs in is appeal. 
DATED this / «3 day of June, 1996. 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Pearce, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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